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PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY IN SPACE: OLD ANSWERS TO NEW
QUESTIONS.
Rosario Avveduto †
Abstract: This comment critically analyzes international space law in the context
of intellectual property. The issues explored, current and future, are at the crossroads of
the international space legal framework and U.S. intellectual property law. The first stage
of the analysis includes a brief history of space law, introducing the U.N. treaties on
space activities and taking a hard look at the founding principles they enshrine. An
analytical overview of the International Space Station Agreement follows, introducing
the present application of space law to issues of intellectual property. This overview
further considers the fundamental principles of U.S. intellectual property, especially
patent law, including the peculiar mandate of the Patents in Space Act. Both preceding
sections highlight issues specifically affecting intellectual property and its development
or enforcement in outer space and reveal the ramifications of this complex topic. After
dissecting the relevant legal norms, the comment explores the future of the interaction
between space and intellectual property, building upon the preceding critical approach to
examine two issues: orbital patents and flags of convenience for patent infringers in
space. Having delineated a number of interpretive problems that scarcely find comfort in
the language of the applicable law, the comment concludes that commercial development
and innovation in outer space will either require an update of international space law
principles or a conscious disregard of its provisions.
Cite as: Rosario Avveduto, Past, Present, and Future of Intellectual Property in Space:
Old Answers to New Questions, 29 WASH. INT’L L.J. 203 (2019).

I.

INTRODUCTION

Four fundamental forces shape the Universe. The existence of
everything in the Universe and the explanation of every phenomenon is
attributable to the effects of at least one of these forces, which are: gravity,
electromagnetic force, weak force, and strong force. 1 These forces are also

†
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1
See generally What Is the Standard Model of Particle Physics, SCIENCE ALERT,
https://www.sciencealert.com/the-standard-model.
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referred to as interactions. They are fundamental because reduction to
simpler interactions is not possible. 2 Figuratively, space law was born and is
evolving as the point of convergence of a different set of four essential
forces that operate in our world: sovereignty, 3 international law, 4 scientific
advancement, 5 and intellectual property. 6 These categorical directives have
informed the human approach to space and will do so in the future.
Sovereignty is the most fundamental relation between states, rooted in
territory, population, authority, and recognition.7 It is hard to imagine future
mass expansion into outer space without picturing some sort of thirdmillennium “colonialism.” 8 Not surprisingly, the first international treaties
on space specifically focused on the issues of national ambitions and
expansion of sovereign states. In particular, the appropriation of space struck
the drafters as a matter of utmost importance and one in need of specific
provisions. 9 National sovereignty in outer space is formally nonexistent as a
matter of international space law, because repudiated by the United Nations
and not contemplated in their treaties. 10 The non-appropriation principle, as

2

See generally id.
See U.N. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, art. 2, Jan. 26, 1967, 610 U.N.T.S. 8843
(devoting a provision to this principle) [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty].
4
See
U.N.
Off.
for
Outer
Space
Aff.,
Space
Law,
http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/index.html (definingspace law as rules, principles, and
standards of international law).
5
See SPACE CHRONOLOGY, http://spacechronology.com/ (featuring a timeline of technical
innovations related to space) (last visited Sept. 2, 2019).
6
International Bureau of World Intellectual Property Organization, International Property
and Space Activities, at 4 (2004), https://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/patent-law/en/developm
ents/pdf/ip_space.pdf (explaining how space technology is at the forefront of technical advancement and, as
such, is the fruit of intellectual creations).
7
THOMAS J. BIERSTEKER & CYNTHIA WEBER, STATE SOVEREIGNTY AS SOCIAL CONSTRUCT, at 14
(Cambridge Studies in International Relations), Cambridge University Press (1996).
8
See Haris Durrani, Is Spaceflight Colonialism?, THE NATION (July 19, 2019),
https://www.thenation.com/article/apollo-space-lunar-rockets-colonialism/;
see
also
Caroline
Haskins, Private Space Companies No Longer Have To Follow The Law, THE OUTLINE (May 8, 2018, 2:31
PM), https://theoutline.com/post/4469/outer-space-treaty-commerce-free-enterprise-bill-spacex-blueorigin-boeing-lockheed-martin?zd=2&zi=yhzwuys2; see also The Colonization of Space, THE WEEK
(Nov. 26, 2018), https://theweek.com/articles/808840/colonization-space.
9
Matthew Thornburg, Are the Non-Appropriation Principle and The Current Regulatory
Regime Governing Geostationary Orbit Equitable for All of Earth’s States?, 40 MICH. J. INT’L L. (2019),
http://www.mjilonline.org/are-the-non-appropriation-principle-and-the-current-regulatory-regimegoverning-geostationary-orbit-equitable-for-all-of-earths-states/ (last visited Aug. 31, 2019).
10
Id.
3
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it currently stands, is obsolete and will not survive the impact of future
commercial expansion. 11
International law balances out sovereignty through the
implementation of international treaties and other legal instruments.12 It
contains the thrust of national ambitions by promoting an organized and
stable legal framework set to defuse tensions and encourage cooperation.
Although international law is mature on Earth, 13 it is still underdeveloped in
terms of space law. 14 In the latter capacity, it mostly serves the preventative
and programmatic purpose of laying the cornerstone of the interactions
between governments in space.15 International law and its space
applications, therefore, run across parallel trajectories. Indeed, space law
rises and falls with international law and diplomacy. 16 Where space law
adopts the pre-existing channels and legal frameworks of international law, it
inherits its limits and flaws as well. 17
Science is the sine qua non of space exploration and research.
Progress, as the consequence of understanding and promoting science,
serves and improves society. 18 The world as we know it is the product of that
understanding. This is particularly true when it comes to space exploration
and space-related scientific efforts. In the context of international space law,
scientific advancements play an essential role and constitute a relevant
portion of state parties’ obligations.19 The importance of science is reflected
in the requirements in terms of funding, effort, and competence, which are

11

Id.; see also Duncan Blake & Steven Freeland, As The World Embraces Space, The 50 Year Old
Outer Space Treaty Needs Adaptation, THE CONVERSATION (July 9, 2017 3:54 PM),
https://theconversation.com/as-the-world-embraces-space-the-50-year-old-outer-space-treaty-needsadaptation-79833.
12
See William R. Slomanson, Fundamental Perspectives on International Law 4 (6th ed. 2011)
(quoting Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 101 (Am. Law Inst.
1987) (defining international law as the law regulating relations between states)).
13
See GERRY SIMPSON et al., GREAT POWERS AND OUTLAW STATES: UNEQUAL SOVEREIGNS IN THE
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 30 (2004) (referring to the conventional origin of international law, the
Treaty of Westphalia).
14
See Kirsten Jusewicz-Haidle, Space Law 2.0, LIFE OF THE LAW (Nov. 24, 2015),
https://www.lifeofthelaw.org/2015/11/space-law-2-0/.
15
See generally Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3.
16
See Kay-Uwe Schrogl, Space Law and Diplomacy, Eighth Nandasiri Jasentuliyana Keynote
Lecture for the Fifty-Ninth International Institute of Space Law Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space
(Sept. 27, 2016) at 1–2, https://iislweb.org/docs/2016keynote.pdf.
17
See id. at 4.
18
See Henk Wesseling, History: Science or Art?, 6.3 EUR. REV. 265, 267 (1998).
19
See generally Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3.
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exceedingly demanding and, therefore, point to a need for a reliable legal
framework taking into account the specific needs of scientific research and
technical innovation. 20
Intellectual Property (“IP”) rights generally support and assure
a continually growing intellectual community and technological progress.21
Creating and incentivizing a supportive environment for research and
development is vital to space exploration. 22 Without it, everything this
comment examines would be nothing but scientific fiction. Different
countries approach the foundational theories of IP in a different fashion, but
the utilitarian, incentive-based theory is by far the most widely accepted.23
Accordingly, the creation of socially valuable intellectual products would
suffer if the creations were defenseless against misappropriation or undue
reproduction. 24 Although the role of IP in space is not different than its role
on Earth,25 the consequences of its implementation in space might be
significantly worse. 26 In the realm of space, a dysfunctional regime of IP
rights not only entails economic and social costs, 27 but also undermines the
successful pursuit of space exploration and settlement, as well as pushing
forward the proximity of their achievement. 28
This comment analyzes an unsettled question resting in between these
four fundamental aspects: how will the territorial nature of IP react to the
development of technology for use in outer space? The inquiry is centered
upon territoriality, non-appropriation, and private actors: with IP expanding
towards space, it is time to entertain the possibility that territoriality and

20

See International Bureau of World Intellectual Property Organization, supra note 6, at 23.
WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, WHAT IS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY? 23 (2003),
https://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/intproperty/450/wipo_pub_450.pdf.
22
See International Bureau of World Intellectual Property Organization , supra note 6. See
also Kimberly Amadeo, NASA Budget, Current Funding, History, and Economic Impact, THE BALANCE (J
une 25, 2019), https://www.thebalance.com/nasa-budget-current-funding-and-history-3306321 (discussing
the extent of the ties between governmental space endeavours and national economy in the United States).
23
See William Fisher, Theories of Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND
POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 168, 168-169 (2001).
24
See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J.
LEGAL STUD. 325, 326 (1989).
25
Star Wars: Protecting and Exploiting IP in Space, WORLD INTELL. PROP. REV. (Apr. 12,
2019), https://www.worldipreview.com/contributed-article/star-wars-protecting-and-exploiting-ip-in-space.
26
Id.
27
See Landes & Posner, supra note 24, at 348 (exploring social costs of unreliable intellectual
property regimes).
28
International Bureau of World Intellectual Property Organization, supra note 6, at 4–5.
21
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non-appropriation are in fact outdated constructs.29 As such, not only might
these concepts be incapable of efficiently regulating the new wave of space
commercialization, they may in fact slow it down.30 Issues relating to the
viability of a territorial IP in a space that lacks an uncontroverted authority
have already been identified by scholars and practitioners. Examples of these
issues are the circumvention of patents in space31 and the appropriation of
physical portions of outer space by way of patenting orbits.32 Assertion and
enforcement of IP rights through a legal framework whose structure appears
impervious to change can be difficult and inefficient for the proper
development of a business dimension in space. 33 Challenges arise out of the
inherently conflicting nature of space law and intellectual property. Indeed,
where international space law is non-territorial, uniform, and based on
shared knowledge, intellectual property law is strictly territorial, not entirely
uniform, and based on exclusive rights.34
A functioning extra-terrestrial legal infrastructure for the development
and enforcement of IP is fundamental for a healthy and productive scientific
environment in space. 35 This premise requires a critical assessment of the
challenges faced by the legal system resulting from the juxtaposition of
intellectual property rights to the U.N. treaties on space. The necessity of
this effort is as current as ever. 36 Since Arianespace became the world’s first
commercial space transportation company in 1980, the world has witnessed
the rise of commercial space actors and the gradual decline of the original,

29

Blake & Freeland, supra note 1111. See also Malcom Davis, Avoiding a Free-For-All: The
Outer Space Treaty Revisited, THE STRATEGIST (Jul. 16, 2018), https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/avoidinga-free-for-all-the-outer-space-treaty-revisited/.
30
See Barbara Luxenberg, Protecting Intellectual Property in Space, PROC. OF THE TWENTYSEVENTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE L. OF OUTER SPACE, 172, 172 (1984).
31
See Adrian Taghdiri, Flags of Convenience and the Commercial Space Flight Industry: The
Inadequacy of Current International Law to Address the Opportune Registration of Space Vehicles in Flag
States, 19 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 405, 407 (2013); see also Theodore U. Ro, et al., Patent Infringement in
Outer Space in Light of 35 U.S.C. § 105: Following the White Rabbit Down the Rabbit Loophole, 17 B.U.
J. SCI. & TECH. L. 202, 212–13 (2011).
32
See Thornburg, supra note 9.
33
See Luxenberg, supra note 30, at 175.
34
See Joanne Irene Gabrynowicz, Opening and Closing Statements; Practitioner’s Panel, Intellectual
Property Resources in and for Space: The Practitioner’s Experience, in 32 J. SPACE L. 385, 406 (2006)
[hereinafter IP Resources].
35
See Marie Weisfeiler, Patent Law in Space, B.C. INTELL. PROP. & TECH. F. 1, 1 (2019)
http://bciptf.org/2019/03/patent-law-in-space.
36
International Bureau of World Intellectual Property Organization, supra at note 6, at 4–5.
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all-public paradigm. 37 This fundamental change has reshaped the relations,
the funding sources, and the prospects of technology in space.38 The world
has abandoned the armaments’ race model developed during the Cold War;
the driver of human expansion into outer space is no longer national pride or
military supremacy. 39 Rather, it is the driving force behind the vast majority
of human activities: business. 40
From Virgin’s space tourism projects 41 to SpaceX’s deployment of the
Starlink satellite constellation to Blue Origin’s lunar landing ambitions,42
private companies all over the globe are approaching new, mesmerizing
opportunities. These enterprises require a significant amount of funding.43
Investment, in turn, requires an assumption of risk offset by reasonable
prospects of return: 44 with respect to technology and innovation, IP rewards
meritorious intellectual creations by providing potential revenue in the form
of monopoly rights. 45 Nevertheless, IP rights––as much as any other––only
serve their purpose when enforceable. In a space where no sovereign exists,
enforcement of IP rights is tied to extra-territorial extensions of jurisdiction
or to old fashioned diplomacy. This creates the risk of loopholes and abuses
threatening the protection of intellectual property. 46 The ultimate purpose of

37
Isabelle Bouvet, Certain Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights in Outer Space, at 3 (Nov. 1999)
(unpublished LL.M. thesis, Air and Space Law Institute, McGill University) (on file with National Library
of Canada) (explaining how the shift towards a private commercial space will happen gradually and that
governmental entities still hold power in the form of preliminary approval).
38
Id. at 4.
39
Id.
40
Loren Grush, NASA is Opening the Space Station to Commercial Business and More
Private Astronauts, THE VERGE (June 7, 2019, 10:13 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2019/6/7/18656280/
nasa-space-station-private-astronauts-commercial-business.
41
See Jon Porter, Virgin Galactic to Become the First Space Tourism Company to Go Public,
THE VERGE (July 9, 2019, 6:47 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2019/7/9/20687323/virgin-galacticpublicly-traded-richard-branson-space-tourism-profitability.
42
Jeff Foust, Blue Origin Unveils Lunar Lander, SPACENEWS (May 9, 2019),
https://spacenews.com/blue-origin-unveils-lunar-lander/; Caleb Henry, SpaceX Launches 60 Starlink
Satellites, Begins Constellation Buildout, SPACENEWS (May 23, 2019), https://spacenews.com/spacexlaunches-60-starlink-satellites-begins-constellation-buildout/.
43
See IP Resources, supra note 34, at 404; see also Porter, supra note 41 (referring to investments
for $800 million).
44
See Risk, INVESTOPEDIA, (July 24, 2019), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/risk.asp.
45
See Landes & Posner, supra note 24, at 326.
46
International Bureau of World Intellectual Property Organization, supra note 6. See also
Luxenberg, supra note 30, at 176.
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this comment is to indicate that, as humanity’s approach to space evolves,
intellectual property and international laws must be ready to adapt.47
Now that this introductory section has outlined the issues and
questions that guide the analysis, the comment moves on to identify the
applicable laws with respect to both space and intellectual property,
providing an overview of the major U.N. Treaties, the ISS Intergovernmental
Agreement, and then touching upon U.S. domestic legislation and legal
principles. Following the survey of the primary sources of law, the comment
addresses two particularized issues relating to IP as it interfaces with space.
Finally, the comment presents the conclusions arising out of the analysis and
argues that a new approach to space law is required to properly address
ambiguities and interpretive conflicts.
II.

PAST AND PRESENT: OLD ANSWERS

A thorough examination of space law hinges upon the understanding
of its history and a survey of its most relevant bodies of law, chief among
them the U.N. Treaties as and the ISS Intergovernmental Agreement. A brief
mention to similar treaties, namely the Antarctica Treaties and the U.N.
Convention on the Law of the Sea, will assist in better understanding the
policy underpinnings of these legal instruments. The consideration of
domestic legislations will focus exclusively on U.S. law, due to its
paradigmatic approach in the comprehensive regulation of intellectual
property and space activities.48
A.

A Brief History of Space Law

The dawn of legislation on space matters bears the mark of the United
Nations. In 1957, the Soviet Union launched Sputnik, the first man-made
object orbiting the Earth, thereby inaugurating the space race. 49 The United
Nations did not sit idle as space technologies sparked interest and wonder,
and endeavored to assure that the new frontier would not be exploited for
military purposes but rather for the sake of humanity’s advancement. 50 In

47

See Weisfeiler, supra note 35.
See Jocelyn H. Shoemaker, The Patents in Space Act: Jedi Mind Trick or Real Protection for
American Inventors on the International Space Station?, 6 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 395, 398 (1999).
49
Elizabeth Howell, Sputnik: The Space Race’s Opening Shot, SPACE.COM (Aug. 22, 2018),
https://www.space.com/17563-sputnik.html.
50
See generally Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3.
48
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1958, the U.N. instituted the Office for Outer Space Affairs (“UNOOSA”) to
serve as the space expert unit of the U.N. Secretariat, the executive arm of
the United Nations. The UNOOSA serves the General Assembly by
implementing its decisions and by fostering intergovernmental cooperation
and awareness. 51 In 1959, the General Assembly established another U.N.
specialized body, the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
(“COPUOS”). The COPUOS consists of a Scientific and Technical
Subcommittee and a Legal Subcommittee, and is tasked with identifying
legal problems related to space and devising the programs to be undertaken
by the U.N. 52
In this capacity, COPUOS negotiated and concluded five treaties
addressing the majority of space law matters of international relevance.
These treaties are widely recognized as the pillars of space law. 53 The first
full-fledged international treaty on space is the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, 54
followed by the 1968 Rescue Agreement, 55 the 1972 Liability Convention,56
and the 1975 Registration Convention,57 all of which further elaborate on
provisions contained in the Outer Space Treaty. Finally, the 1979 Moon
Treaty, 58 with only 18 parties, is considered a failed treaty because, due to its
stringent obligations and vague wording, not a single country engaged in
manned space missions has ratified it. 59 It is noteworthy that the Treaties do
not speak to private entities nor directly regulate their activities; instead,

51

Roles
and
Responsibilities,
U.N.
OFF.
FOR
OUTER
SPACE
AFF.,
http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/aboutus/roles-responsibilities.html.
52
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (2019), U.N. OFF. FOR OUTER SPACE AFF. (2019),
http://www/unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/copuos/index.htm.
53
Space Law Treaties and Principles, U.N. OFF. FOR OUTER SPACE AFF.
http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties.html.
54
See generally Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3.
55
G.A. Res. 2345 (XXII), annex, Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts
and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space (Dec. 17, 1967).
56
G.A. Res. 2777 (XXVI), annex, Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by
Space Objects (Nov. 29, 1971).
57
G.A. Res. 3235 (XXIX), annex, Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer
Space (Nov. 12, 1974).
58
G.A. Res. 34/68, annex, Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies (Dec. 5, 1979).
59
See Timothy G. Nelson, The Moon Agreement and Private Enterprise: Lessons from Investment
Law, 17 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 393, 402 (2011). See also Michael Listner, The Moon Treaty: Failed
International Law or Waiting in the Shadows?, THE SPACE REVIEW (Oct. 24, 2011),
http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1954/1.
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they impose obligations on states governments or their agencies,
officializing their dual role of space actors and supervisory authorities.60
B.

The U.N. Treaties

1.

The Outer Space Treaty:

The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the
Exploration and Use of Outer Space including the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies is the master document of space law, also referred to as the Space
Constitution.61 This is due to both the essential value of its legal tenets and
its ratification by 109 countries as of July 2019,62 the latter making it the
most widely accepted legal instrument in space law. The Treaty revolves
around a number of main principles: freedom of exploration and exploitation
of outer space, non-appropriation, peaceful use, and national jurisdiction and
responsibility over space objects.
Among these principles, chief is non-appropriation. Accordingly,
outer space is not subject to national claim by virtue of sovereignty or other
means.63 The principle follows the general premise laid out in Article I,
stating that the exploration and use of outer space is free for all states and all
countries should benefit from it. 64 Outer space is solemnly defined as the
province of all mankind.65 However, it has been pointed out that freedom of

60

Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Rep. of the Legal Subcomm. on Its Forty-Eighth
Session, Annex 3, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.2, A/5181 (2012) (reporting the discussion between the
Soviet Union and the United States with respect to the scope of the U.N. Treaties namely, whether the
Treaties would allow private actors free access to space or whether it should be limited to states). See also
Berin
Szoka
&
James
Dunstan,
How
the
U.S.
Can
Lead
the
Way
to
Extraterrestrial Land Deals, WIRED (Apr. 9, 2012, 1:58 PM), https://www.wired.com/2012/04/opinionspace-property-rights/ (debating the inexistence of a loophole in favor of private actors based on the
obligation of member states to the treaties to have their citizens conform to the treaties’ provisions) (last
visited Aug. 31, 2019).
61
See Jill Stuart, The Outer Space Treaty has Been Remarkably Successful – But Is It Fit for
the Modern Age?, THE CONVERSATION (Jan. 27, 2017, 11:59 AM), https://theconversation.com/the-outerspace-treaty-has-been-remarkably-successful-but-is-it-fit-for-the-modern-age-71381.
See also Loren Grush, How an International Treaty Signed 50 Years Ago Became the Backbone for Space
Law, THE VERGE (Jan. 27, 2017, 11:14 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2017/1/27/14398492/outer-spacetreaty-50-anniversary-exploration-guidelines (last visited Sept. 1, 2019).
62
See Status of International Agreements Relating to Activities in Outer Space, UNOOSA,
http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/status/index.html.
63
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, at 9–10 (art. II).
64
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, at 9 (art. I).
65
Id.
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use and non-appropriation might, in fact, be conflicting concepts. 66 Indeed,
the argument goes that states or private actors cannot carry out “use” of
space without laying a claim to that particular portion of space, which
represents a central issue in the context of asteroid mining.67 The resulting
uncertainty has several ramifications, the most comedic of which has been
the sale of lunar and planetary acres by the company Lunar Embassy,
following a self-proclaimed appropriation made in 1980 by its owner. 68 This
is clearly an extreme case study, mostly irrelevant from a practical
perspective; however, it exemplifies the great potential for
misunderstandings and gray areas that this sector of the law harbors, other
than highlighting states’ reluctance or inability to form a united front in
addressing the matter. 69
Another cardinal rule within the Treaty is the categorical prohibition
of military applications in outer space, including orbiting weapons of mass
destruction, military installations and facilities, weapon tests, and military
maneuvers on or around celestial bodies. 70 The Treaty allows the use of
military personnel, equipment, or facilities only for scientific purposes.71 It
is interesting to note the interplay between this comprehensive ban and two
recent instances of professed military applications. First is the
implementation of one of the United States Trump Administration’s
directives involving space, announced in March 2018, which calls for the
establishment of a space force for the purpose of assuring the peaceful use of
space and the defense of the United States and its allies. 72 The force rises
from the ashes of the U.S. Space Command and has earned the spotlight
once again in August 2019, when the Administration announced its official

66

See Thornburg, supra note 9.
See Jesse Dunietz, Floating Treasure: Space Law Needs to Catch Up with Asteroid Mining,
SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN (Aug. 28, 2017), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/floating-treasurespace-law-needs-to-catch-up-with-asteroid-mining/; see also Berin Szoka & James Dunstan, Space Law: Is
Asteroid Mining Legal?, WIRED (May 1, 2012, 11:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2012/05/opinionasteroid-mining/.
68
Adam Mann, Space Cases: The Weirdest Legal Claims in Outer Space, WIRED (June 1, 2012, 6:30
AM), https://www.wired.com/2012/06/space-cases/.
69
See Dunietz, supra note 67 (debating the different interpretations given to the
Outer Space Treaty non-appropriation clause).
70
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, at 4 (art. IV).
71
Id.
72
Marin Koren, What Does Trump Mean by ‘Space Force?, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 13, 2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2018/03/trump-space-force-nasa/555560/.
67
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establishment. 73 The same issue also emerged in Europe. On July 13, 2019,
France announced the institution of a new branch of the French Airforce,
scheduled for official establishment in September 2019.74 As noted, the
announcement set forth an undisguised intention to implement defensive
systems, i.e., weapons, to protect satellites or ground installations, and it
contemplates the incorporation of said space force into the traditional air
force.75 Given that such armed forces would operate in space in a military
capacity, it is reasonable to interpret their presence and future activities as a
violation of Article IV. 76
Another foundational principle of the international law of space, as
embodied in the Outer Space Treaty, is responsibility. Under Article VI,
parties to the Treaty are responsible for national activities conducted in outer
space. 77 Notably, the provision contemplates governmental actors as well as
non-governmental ones, hinting at the supervisory and regulatory profile that
states will maintain in the wake of space commercial actors.78 This
regulatory profile is envisioned in two main forms: authorization and
supervision. The concept of responsibility is also reflected in Article VII,
which provides that state parties are liable for damages caused by their space
objects or their components, both in space and on Earth. 79 However, the
provision points out that state liability defined as such will be pursued
through diplomatic means. 80 This poses challenges to the overall workability
and precedent-setting of these provisions, especially in the context of
intellectual property, where enforcement is key. 81
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National Jurisdiction is a concept that echoes throughout this
comment and is indeed a main point of convergence between intellectual
property and space law. Under the Outer Space Treaty, state parties retain
jurisdiction and control over objects launched to space that appear on their
registry, a special index kept by state authorities for purposes of keeping
track of space objects. 82 Ownership of objects launched to outer space is not
affected by their presence in space or their return to Earth, meaning that
distance from Earth or location in outer space have no bearing on the legal
status of an object launched to space.83 This provision set the stage for the
development of the Registration Convention and offered the first glimpse of
a stable legal framework for space activities. However, the provision
necessarily rests on the absence of independently launched space objects,
i.e., objects launched outside of the jurisdiction and supervision of sovereign
states. Notably, it is unclear whether this absence is predicated on the states’
supposedly inescapable supervision powers or on the non-currency of the
issue. It is reasonable to presume that the situation will change dramatically
with the advancements of private commercial space capabilities such as
micro-satellites, which would allow space actors with relatively limited
resources to operate in space for purposes of space law. 84
2.

The Rescue Agreements

The so-called Rescue Agreements comprise the Agreement on the
Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts, and the Return of Objects
Launched in Outer Space. The Agreements came into force in 1968 and
elaborated on Articles V and VIII of the Outer Space Treaty, mandating the
formation of a cooperative regime for the rescue and return of astronauts and
objects to their home states.85 The founding principle of the Agreements is
simple: state parties must cooperate for the purpose of rescuing and
recovering personnel or launched objects that incurred in an accident,
emergency, or distress, resulting in the object unintentionally landing in
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another state’s territory. 86 The statement focuses on the rescue and assistance
to personnel. Whereas astronauts in the Outer Space Treaty are loosely
defined with no express indications as to whether the designation includes
civilians (e.g., space tourists), the Agreements provide more clarity by using
the more comprehensive term “personnel.”87
3.

Liability Convention

The Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by
Space Objects came into force in 1972, after nine years of negotiations led
by the Legal Subcommittee of COPUOS. 88 The Liability Convention stems
from the exigency to elaborate rules of states’ liability for damage caused by
space objects and establish dispute resolution procedures.89 It is instructive
to look at the definition of damage provided in the first provision of the
Convention: damage is the “loss of or damage to property of States or of
persons, natural and juridical.”90 The Convention provides another notable
principle: damage caused elsewhere than on the surface of Earth by a state’s
object triggers liability only where the state is at fault.91 Under this
definition, states’ liability can be indirect when arising out of the actions of
personnel for which the state is responsible. 92 There are at least two features
of interest: first, the definition of fault, and second, the extent of the
responsibility for purposes of states’ liability. The previously defined
“absolute” liability of state parties is in fact mitigated by Article VI in cases
where the damaging conduct consists of grossly negligent or intentional acts
or omissions committed by the claimant state or the natural or juridical
persons it represents. 93 The Liability Convention also specifies that a state is
not liable for damage caused to its own nationals as well as foreign nationals
participating in its operations. 94
The Liability Convention’s relevance within the two-headed
framework of IP and space law rises and falls with the incorporation of IP
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rights within the definition of property. The sweeping definition of property
adopted by the Convention does not seem to obviate this ambiguity.
Moreover, further reference to other U.N. documents indicates that
intellectual property rights are generally deemed to be a subset of property
rights.95 The question is, therefore, whether inclusion of intellectual property
can be inferred through a systematic interpretation of these two general
principles. The scope of rights within the definition of property is relevant
because the definition of damage within the Convention contemplates
rendering the property unfit for its intended use. 96 A stretched argument
could be made in favor of intellectual property within the scope of the
Liability Convention and, subsequently, infringement of those rights as an
instance of liability. Following this line of thought, a space object
developing or reproducing infringing technology in space could in principle
deprive the originally patented technology of its intended use, thereby
causing damage under the Convention. Regardless of the merits of the
argument, the consensus within the legal community generally refutes the
extension of the U.N. Treaties to IP rights and, consequently, to patent
infringement. 97
Article IX represents an important provision for the purpose of this
comment. The wording provides that a claim for compensation can only be
presented through diplomatic channels. 98 To complicate matters, the
provision adds that nothing in the Liability Convention bars the pursuit of
claims in local courts by a state or its natural or juridical persons, and that
state claims cannot address the same damages acted upon through
diplomatic means. 99 The ramifications of this legislative choice are
manifold. First and foremost, diplomatic intercourse is presented as the
preferred venue for space-related disputes, possibly because of its non-
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binding nature. 100 Secondly, the adjudication of space-related claims would
conform to concepts of international influence and comity and, therefore, be
unfit to supplant judicial determinations.101 Finally, parallel litigation and
behind-closed-doors settlements would hinder the development of a uniform
“common law of space,” considering the historical and structural
dissimilarities between the two resolution methods and their different
precedential power. 102
The failure of diplomatic discourse does not, however, exhaust the
procedure. 103 The Liability Convention calls for the establishment of a threemember Claims Commission, which strongly resembles an arbitral tribunal.
Indeed, on the sides, there are two appointees to serve the respective state
parties, and in the middle, a joint appointee to serve as chairman. The
Commission decides the merits of the dispute and determines the
compensation.104 At this point, however, the Convention takes a step back by
providing that the decisions of the Commission are only final and binding
when accepted by the parties, being otherwise merely recommendatory. 105
4.

The Registration Convention

The Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer
Space entered into force in 1976. Its primary purpose was to create a system
for the record-keeping and identification of space objects. 106 This
Convention also intended to expand the scope of the U.N. Register of
Objects Launched into Outer Space, established in 1961, and further regulate
states’ responsibilities related to space objects. 107
The Registration Convention holds particular value. The registration
of a space object is, as explained infra, the necessary predecessor of the
application of a nation’s domestic laws, including intellectual property
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laws.108 The Registration Convention provides a definition of launching state
that is fundamental in the application of legal concepts, such as jurisdiction
and territoriality. 109 A launching state is either (1) a state launching or
procuring the launch of a space objects, or (2) a state from whose territory or
facilities a space object is launched.110 Critics have highlighted that this dual
identification may in fact not coincide, thereby creating confusion.111
Indeed, these definitions might create situations in which a space objects has
two or more launching states 112 or none at all. The Registration Convention
addresses the concern by providing that each state that qualifies under either
of the two prongs can maintain the space object on its own registries.113
However, the provision further recites that there can only be one “launching
state” for the purpose of Article I; multiple launching states must jointly
decide which one will serve that role. 114
5.

The Moon Treaty

From an international law viewpoint, the Agreement Governing the
Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies is the second
most impactful of the U.N. treaties.115 Conversely from the Outer Space
Treaty, the relevance of the Moon Treaty derives from its unsuccessful
adoption, which sheds light on the policy and legislative challenges that
arise in connection with the development of uniform space governance.
Indeed, one of the pivotal points of the Treaty is the cession of jurisdiction
over all celestial bodies in the solar system to the authority of an
international governing body. 116 The scope of application of the Treaty
equates the moon to other celestial bodies within the solar system––except
Earth––as well as orbits and trajectories around the moon itself.117 It is
unclear whether the Treaty also governs orbits and trajectories around
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celestial bodies other than the moon: the interpretive consensus favors a
scope limited to circumlunar space.118 Notably, there exists an exception for
celestial bodies regulated by virtue of specific legal norms; the Treaty only
applies in the absence of sui generis agreements. 119 This provision likely
refers to internationally adopted legal norms. However, there is no express
indication as to whether specific legal norms include multi-national
agreements concluded outside of the vigilant eye of the United Nations.
The Treaty further elaborates on the well-known principle of nonappropriation by providing that the moon shall not be subject to claims of
sovereignty or occupation. 120 Unlike the Outer Space Treaty, the prohibition
to establish property rights on the surface or subsurface of the moon extends
to non-governmental entities as well as natural persons. Notably, under the
Treaty, the installation of facilities or modules does not create any property
right whatsoever in the adjacent area. 121 The provision attempts to surpass
the Outer Space Treaty in yet another fashion: Article 11 extends nonappropriation to natural resources in place on the satellite.122 The stringency
and apparent unworkability of the provisions, coupled with their ambiguities
ultimately caused the Treaty’s demise. 123 From this point of view, exemplary
is another animating principle of the Treaty, summarized as the creation of
an international regime for the governance and supervision of the
exploitation, development, and management of the moon’s resources.124
Clearly another source of friction, the Treaty’s experiment revealed the
reluctance of states and the practical difficulties around the establishment of
such an authority.
From an IP perspective, Article 15 tops its predecessors in terms of
relevance. The provision calls for compliance with the Treaty by conferring
a seemingly unfettered right to inspect on all coexisting states on the
relevant areas. 125 Inspections under the norm encompass space vehicles,
equipment, facilities, and installations. This measure, mitigated only by the
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requirement of reasonable advance notice, is predicated on the need to
guarantee that the activities of other states are Treaty-compliant.126 To
complicate matters, the provision allows every state to act independently,
with or without the assistance of other parties, with diplomatic discourse
being merely optional.127 To add to the confusion, the Treaty also
contemplates a consultation procedure which, unlike inspection rights, is
conditioned upon a reasonable belief that another state’s activities are noncompliant.128 The provision does not address the overlap between the two
measures and therefore points to a double standard in the requirements
despite their substantially similar purpose. Indeed, it is unclear why an
innocuous consultation would have to be based on a reasonable cause,
whereas a physical inspection could be carried out deliberately. 129 A nonexhaustive answer might be found in the measures’ different purposes:
where consultations seemingly aim at resolving disputes, inspections seek to
determine the existence of the issue in the first place. 130 The relevance of the
provision in the context of IP will emerge in the wake of space commercial
expansion. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine private commercial modules and
installations on celestial bodies, below their surface, or in orbit being freely
accessible for inspection. Considering the increasing volume of interactions
between governments and private actors, the subjects of this obligation may
as well be private commercial entities, with foreseeable consequences in
terms of distrust and reluctance to open the doors to foreign inspectors who
might also be competitors.
The most illustrative feature of the Moon Treaty lies in the
circumstance that not a single nation engaged in manned space missions has
ratified it. 131 The instrument has consequently gained the infamous
designation of failed treaty. 132 Concerns over the international regime
overseeing the sharing and allotment of the Moon’s resources led to the
demise of the project, fueled by a general distrust towards its vague
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language, prohibitive obligations, and seemingly socialist underpinnings.133
Some scholars argue that the Treaty’s failure did not involve its scope, but
rather its means: its hastily arranged provisions depicted an unreliable legal
environment for the development of private space activities and thus
discouraged support from spacefaring nations.134
6.

A Policy Note

It is not challenging to understand why the United Nations sought to
impose stringent terms on the use of space and celestial bodies, and how
these principles still echo in the Treaties, as well as in other international
instruments. These policies might indeed look outdated and overly
programmatic in the eyes of the third-millennium space enthusiast.
However, one must remember that the Cold War deeply influenced the
adoption of these instruments. 135 At the time of negotiation and adoption of
the Treaties, space was deemed to have the potential to become the ultimate
frontier for conflicts on the global scale.136 While businesses carried on by
private enterprises were not a comparable concern, many believed that a
functioning commercial environment––in the absence of the U.N. treaties––
would have required militarization of space, thereby increasing the chances
of conflicts. 137 Those concerns have now abated, hence the need to reassess
their footprint on the future development of international space law.
C.

A Framework for International Terrotoriality: The Antarctic Treaty

It is interesting to juxtapose the Outer Space Treaty to the Antarctic
Treaty, adopted in 1959 and currently featuring 54 state parties. 138 In general
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lines, both treaties strive to regulate human activity in a hostile environment
devoid of native human population and resources to support it. Their similar
purpose reflects similar principles, chief among them the peaceful
coexistence of different states in these environments. Indeed, U.S. President
Dwight D. Eisenhower specifically referred to the Antarctic Treaty in his
proposal of Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty to the United Nations.139
The Antarctic Treaty’s key provisions resemble those of the Outer Space
Treaty: peaceful use of the environment, prohibition of military bases and
activity, prohibition of nuclear weapons testing, freedom of scientific
exploration and investigation, and interchange of scientific data and
personnel between the parties.140 Both the Antarctic and the Outer Space
treaties apply to geographical areas demarcated by virtue of conventional
definitions: where Antarctica is the land and ice shelves south of 60°S
latitude141, outer space is everything above the so-called Karman Line,
situated at 100 kilometers above sea level. Nevertheless, the scope of
application of the Outer Space Treaty appears somewhat harder to define. A
first reason can be found in the fact the conventional border of outer space,
the Karman Line, is not mentioned nor referred to in the treaty. 142 Secondly,
different authorities or nations adhere in fact to inconsistent definitions of
the starting point of the outer space. 143 Both these circumstances affect the
clear demarcation between space and Earth and impinge on the fundamental
question of whether space law or national law applies in a determined area
of air space.
The Outer Space Treaty and its Antarctic counterpart present another
essential element of divergence; the Antarctic Treaty does not abhor
sovereignty claims. 144 In fact, the Antarctic treaty recognizes and tolerates
appropriation by providing that no obligation under the treaty shall conflict
with a state party’s claim on a portion of Antarctica. 145 Unsurprisingly, the
signatories of the Antarctic Treaty, namely, Argentina, Australia, Chile,
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France, New Zealand, Norway, and the United Kingdom, all had territorial
claims on the continent––some of them overlapping––prior to the adoption
of the Treaty. 146
It has been argued that peaceful coexistence of multiple sovereign
claims in Antarctica is not the fruit of international treaties nor diplomacy
efforts, but rather the absence of a sufficient incentive to engage in more
substantial exploitation of the territory. 147 Drawing from notions of law and
economics, the hypothesis is that compliance in this case is the outcome of a
cost-benefit analysis, which is the value of resources under the surface of the
continent against the investment necessary to extract and exploit them.148
From this standpoint, we can anticipate difficult days for the principle of
non-appropriation in outer space. The faster we advance towards space
colonization or asteroid mining, the faster we approach a cost-benefit
analysis with respect to its resources and the ability to extract them. Where
one side of the ledger is represented by the chance to exploit virtually
endless resources, it is not difficult to understand the value of these
opportunities and their potential to tip the scales in favor of disregard of
international space law.
D.

The ISS Intergovernmental Agreement

Another international agreement sheds light and provides possible
suggestions on how to structure a proper space legal infrastructure. It is the
International Space Station Intergovernmental Agreement, comprising a
general agreement between the governments of the United States, Canada,
the European Union, Russia, and Japan; four Memoranda of Understanding
between their space agencies; and various bilateral agreements.149
For the purpose of this comment, the analysis will focus solely on the
Intergovernmental Agreement. The Agreement presents several features of
interest, first among them a contractual rather than programmatic identity.
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Indeed, the Agreement is clearly oriented to the creation and governance of a
partnership, and only tangentially enounces general statements of
principle.150 The Agreement is part of a complex framework whose scope is
broader than the mere regulation of space activities by governments,
encompassing management, contribution or disposition of resources, and
future evolution of the International Space Station. Notably, it represents a
first comprehensive regulatory instrument with respect to a specific set of
space activities, which means it is the first major legal instrument to
interface itself with the obligations imposed by the U.N. Treaties.151 The
Agreement represents a remarkable example of cooperative regulation of
space that has been in force for more than 20 years. 152
As Article 1 describes it, the Agreement is a cooperative framework
for the design, development, and operation of a civil international space
station, to be permanently inhabited. 153 There is a connection between the
Intergovernmental Agreement and the U.N. treaties in the statement that the
Station shall be used and operated in compliance with international law,
including the U.N. treaties on space. 154 The Agreement does not alter the
rights and obligations of partner states as imposed by the treaties nor does it
affect the partner states with regard to space endeavors unrelated to the
Space Station.155 Notably, the instrument subscribes to the non-appropriation
principle by providing that nothing in the agreement constitutes a basis for
asserting a claim over outer space. The International Space Station
Agreement recognizes the Registration Convention by reproducing its
founding principle that each partner state retains jurisdiction and control
over the modules it registers and its nationals who are onboard. 156 It is useful
to note that partner states maintain the ability to transfer ownership in the
modules to a non-partner state or private entity, subject to concurrence by
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the partners. 157 Even more interesting is the United States’ intent to divest its
participation in the Station by 2025, because of the prohibitive maintenance
costs. 158 Although a NASA-free Space Station would certainly be a dramatic
and undesirable outcome, it certainly ignites one’s curiosity to imagine the
Station as a dynamic asset available to the highest bidder. For better or
worse, the possibility of acquiring a stake in the use and physical modules of
the Station supports the vision of the Agreement as a quasi-private legal
framework, where divestible interest assumes priority over mere
international obligations. 159
A peculiar system governs utilization of the Station by the partners.
Every partner receives so-called utilization rights based on the resources
they contribute. 160 Resources, such as laboratories, can be user elements, or
infrastructure elements, such as navigational software.161 This thirdmillennium barter system contemplates a fixed share of use of certain
elements in exchange for a set amount of resources.162 Partners can further
barter or sell their allotted utilization right, freely and among each other,163
or dispose of said rights in favor of private entities. An opportunity, this one,
embraced by NASA for the purpose of offsetting operating expenses and
promoting commercial engagement.164 For each proposed use, the partner
state providing the element must determine whether the use is peaceful. This
provision is further structured so as to minimize the risk that such
assessment be invoked to prevent states from rightfully using the Station’s
infrastructure. 165
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Article 21 is a dense provision that substantiates the pragmatic spirit
of the Agreement by specifically addressing intellectual property. 166 In this
sense, the Intergovernmental Agreement constitutes the present of
intellectual property in space. The Agreement reflects the increased
awareness of the importance of intellectual property rights that stimulate and
reward the development of technical innovations in space.167 By reference to
the Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization of
1967, intellectual property within the scope of the Agreement is defined to
include inventions, performances, trademarks, unfair competition, scientific
discoveries, literary works, industrial designs.168 For the purpose of
intellectual property laws, activities on the Station are deemed to occur in
the territory of the partner state having the specific Space Station element on
its national registry. 169 For instance, if a Canadian inventor develops an
invention in a module registered with Canada, then Canadian law will apply
because the invention is considered developed within the territory of
Canada.170 As far as European countries are concerned, any member state of
the European Space Agency (“ESA”) can claim jurisdiction over the
concerned activity in European flight elements as if it had occurred in its
territory. In instances where more states participate in research or
experiments, the participation of a second state does not by itself exclude the
governing state’s exclusive jurisdiction. The wording of this provision does
not seem to rule out a stipulation to the contrary. 171
Paragraphs 4 and 5 of Article 21 consider the peculiar position of
partner states that are also members of the ESA. With respect to ESA
member states that operate on the International Space Station, the possibility
exists that their national intellectual property laws may overlap. 172 The first
provision contemplates instances in which a person or entity holds
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intellectual property rights in more than one European state. It substantially
bars multiple bites at the apple in the event of IP infringement on ESAregistered modules: consequently, an act of infringement on the same IP
rights held in different ESA countries can only lead to one recovery. 173 This
offsets the extreme applications of the principle giving ESA member states
shared jurisdiction over conducts occurring on ESA-registered modules.174
Notably, Article 21 Paragraph 4 also applies to acts of infringement
generating different plaintiffs in different ESA states. In these cases, only the
first-filed action can obtain redress. However, the provision does not impose
the staying of subsequent proceedings, providing instead that a court may
stay the proceeding pending the concurrent action. 175 This adds to the
complexity of multi-state litigations and causes the first-to-file rule to battle
with courts’ efficiency and overall quality of the litigation process in the
states involved.176 One final nuance in the provision’s terminology regards
the difference between multiple damages awards and multiple court
proceedings.177 Since a bar on recovery presumes a winning plaintiff, the
owner of IP rights in different states might force the adversary to fight
multiple instances of litigation until either (1) the venues are exhausted, or
(2) a court awards recovery. Fortunately, these concerns are marginal in
relevance because several instruments, although imperfect, avoid abusive
practices in European courts. 178 Moreover, Paragraph 5 provides a built-in,
practical solution rooted in IP licensing principles: a European partner state
cannot deny the validity of a license for purposes of defeating infringement
claims, so long as that license is enforceable in at least one of the member
states. 179 Compliance with the terms of such a license in one state bars
recovery in every other ESA partner state.180 Therefore, multi-state
enforcement of the same IP rights against the same acts is limited where the
acts are in compliance with a license that is valid in a European state.
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The Agreement also provides that the presence of an object in the
territory of a partner state for the purpose of transportation to the Station or
another partner state cannot be the basis for patent infringement claims in
the state where the transition occurs.181 This is known as the principle of
temporary presence, a legal fiction contemplated in several international
legal instruments. 182 Accordingly, partner states are generally free to transfer
to the Space Station technology that would otherwise infringe the IP laws of
other member states by virtue of entering or crossing their territory in in
order to reach the Station. The point is seemingly to avoid the possibility
that states with more developed space capabilities might frustrate the efforts
of other partner states by, for instance, conditioning the use of their transit or
launch facilities to the licensing of nationally developed technology. 183
E.

The U.S. Domestic Approach

National legislators have heeded the call for a more reliable space law
legal framework, for reasons ranging from commercial incentivization to
compliance with international space law. 184 The present section’s focus is on
national space laws and intellectual property rights, with U.S. domestic
legislation taking the lead role, for two reasons. First, because U.S. law is
generally considered a mature and developed environment for intellectual
property, with roots in experience yet great potential for change, due to its
court-based system. 185 Second, because the U.S. moved early steps in the
regulation of space legal issues, including the joint regulation of intellectual
property and space law. The U.S. constitutes the benchmark of national
regulations in both intellectual property and space law 186 and therefore,
represents an assessable example of the workability and challenges of such
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intertwined bodies of laws. The following section introduces the U.S.
intellectual property regime with a focus on patent law, focusing in
particular on the so-called principle of territoriality. An overview of the
Patents in Space Act follows, presenting an example of national legislation
addressing issues of IP in the context of space activities.
1.

U.S. Patent Law

As new technologies emerge and old technologies wane, courts
struggle with the limits of a strictly territorial regime of intellectual property
rights. The Internet challenged the conventional limits of trademarks and
copyrights and provided an indication of the judicial discomfort surrounding
the determination of the territorial limits of IP rights.187 Following the
diffusion of unbundled software and the extension of patents to software and
intangible inventions, courts confronted similar interpretive issues affecting
the territorial reach of patent rights. 188 Whether related to the aerospace
industry or not, the innovations challenging the courts share one common
feature: the ability to exist or operate, entirely or partially, outside national
borders.189 It is therefore instructive to look at how territoriality has
developed and its current status.
The principle of territoriality, particularly dear to patent law, is a
cardinal rule of the system. Patents are temporary monopoly rights granted
by governments which provide an exclusive right to make, use, sell or
import the invention they attach to. Patents are in principle granted in the
interest of a continually expanding human knowledge and technical
advancement: the inventor contributes its knowledge in exchange for the
temporary, exclusive right to commercially exploit that knowledge. Patent
rights are necessarily limited to the territory subject to the issuing
government’s jurisdiction. 190 The U.S. Supreme Court eloquently stated the
principle in Microsoft Corp. v. AT & T Corp: “the presumption that United
States law governs domestically but does not rule the world applies with
particular force in patent law.” 191 It follows that transnational enforcement of
patents is fundamentally conditioned upon either international treaties or

187
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multi-state portfolios192 of patents relating to the same invention.193 The
international filing of a patent is, however, burdensome and pricey because it
requires an individual application to be multiplied by the number of
countries in which the inventor seeks protection.194 Uniform procedures,
such as the one enshrined in the Patent Cooperation Treaty, 195 represent a
first step towards a more uniform patent system. However, there is currently
no such thing as an international patent. The Cooperation Treaty merely
established a unified filing date for purposes of priority; each application
still needs to be pursued individually in the respective jurisdiction. 196 From
the viewpoint of developing technologies, territoriality poses one peculiar
challenge. Considering that patent infringement under U.S. law requires an
infringing activity in the United States, 197 the question is whether
decentralized systems and processes partially residing outside of its borders,
including in space, fall within this scope.
Courts initially struggled with the interpretive challenge presented by
this issue, practicing restraint with respect to extra-territorial extensions of
jurisdiction. 198 The Federal Circuit addressed the issue in 2005, in NTP v.
Research in Motion, holding that use of a patent claiming a system can
infringe even when the system’s components reside abroad.199 However, the
court also held that methods or processes, because of their sequential nature
and because of the individuality of each of their steps, cannot be practiced in
the United States unless each step of the method or process is performed
within the country’s borders.200 With respect to system or apparatus claims,
infringement occurs, even when certain components are located outside of
U.S. territory, so long as the United States is the place where the system as a
whole is put into service. 201 Although the Federal Circuit looked at two
factors previously adopted by the Court of Claims in Decca Limited v.
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United States, control and beneficial use,202 it ultimately adopted a slightly
different standard that takes into account the location of the invention’s
components and use.203 It is important to note the antithetic positions that
Supreme Court and Federal Circuit traditionally adopt with regard to the
statement of seminal principles in patent law; the standards in NTP and
Deepsouth exemplify the dissimilarity in their views.204
The meaning of the NPT holding is illustrative of the IP side of this
comment’s inquiry. Concepts such as control and beneficial use and their
counterparts in NPT determine the application of U.S. patent jurisdiction to
cases where no country formally extends its law to an unregistered
spacecraft. Their correct interpretation would allow patent holders to protect
against infringers whose technology is partially or entirely far from the
borders, in all cases where the technology’s overall use, service, or control
points to the United States. This would clearly include and support the
extension of patent laws to spacecrafts or other space objects that are not
registered for the purpose of the Registration Convention. 205
The specific issue of patent infringement relating to technology
operating in space appeared before the U.S. Court of Federal Claims in
1993. 206 The court addressed the issue of whether a satellite that had never
entered the United States constituted infringing technology, where the
satellite had been built and was primarily operated from the United
Kingdom. 207 The court held that, despite the fact that the satellite’s central
communication link was a NASA facility in Maryland, the United States did
not exercise sufficient control because, per Decca, no “master station” was
present in the country. 208 Therefore, the satellite could not infringe on a U.S.
patent because its use did not take place “within the United States.” The
court further elaborated on the control prong, reasoning that control would
have surfaced had NASA “originated the [control] commands within the
United States” and transmitted them directly from their facility. 209 The
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decision clearly focuses on Decca’s control factors and does not consider
any location or service factors as they were later explored in NTP.
Issues regarding the correct definition of territoriality within the scope
of 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) have also caused concern outside the context of space.
A paradigmatic example is the Exclusive Economic Zone. Under the United
Nations Convention on the Law of Sea of 1982, to which the U.S. is not a
party, the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) is the area comprised between
twelve and two hundred nautical miles from a state’s coastal baseline.210
Under the Convention, a nation has full sovereign rights over its own
“territorial sea,” i.e., within twelve nautical miles from its coast. A nation’s
sovereignty diminishes drastically after that point: this is the so-called
contiguous zone, stretching as far as twenty-four nautical miles seaward.
Within this area, states can only enforce their laws on foreign vessels that
have committed certain violations while within their territorial waters. 211
Commentators have pointed out to an ambiguity in the territorial
language affecting the application of U.S. patent laws to the Zone.212 In
particular, the question is whether U.S. economic interests in the area and
the nation’s assertions of sovereignty over the same imply that the Zone is,
for purposes of § 271(a), “within the United States.” Only one case
addressed the issue. In WesternGeco L.L.C. v. ION Geophysical Corp.,213 the
infringement suit related to cable-like devices for the seismic survey of
marine environments. The alleged infringer shipped separate components of
the device overseas for assembly into a device indistinguishable from the
patentee’s. 214 The District Court for Southern District of Texas held that
practicing the patented invention beyond the twelfth mile off U.S. coasts did
not constitute make or use-based infringement because the Exclusive
Economic Zone was not “within the United States.”215 The court explained
that the reluctance to extend patent law to cover infringement within the
Zone was rooted in the absence of statutory instruction, thereby hinting that
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express Congressional action would resolve the issue. 216 WesternGeco also
addressed territoriality with respect to 35 U.S.C. § 271(f), a provision
amending the holding of Deepsouth217 in order to prevent infringers from
escaping liability by shipping unassembled components abroad. 218 The
additional issue was whether infringers would be liable for using the
invention assembled abroad in a way that would harm the U.S. patentee, for
instance, by securing service contracts or otherwise competing with the
patentee.219
The Federal Circuit reversed the lower court and held that a patent
holder could not recover profits because “Congress [did not intend] to
extend the United States patent law to cover uses abroad of the articles
created from the exported components.”220 The court reasoned that foreign
exploitation by a defendant of a patented invention is not infringement when
the extraterritorial production, use, or sale of the invention has no connection
whatsoever with a domestic act of infringement. 221 Accordingly, a patentee
“cannot recover lost profits resulting from its failure to win foreign
contracts,” even when the failure stems from a previous act of the infringer
occurred outside the jurisdiction of the United States. In 2018, the issue
reached the Supreme Court, which reversed the previous decision and held
once and for all that a patentee is entitled to recover lost profits for extraterritorial conduct provided there is a sufficient showing of infringement
under § 271(f). 222 The Court highlighted the difference between extraterritorial conduct and damages consequential to said conduct: patent law is
not applied extra-territorially simply because “damages occurred
extraterritorially” as a consequence of foreign conduct.223 In other words, the
extraterritorial propagations of domestic infringing conduct can give rise to
lost-profits based on damages occurred abroad. As applied to space, the
holding signifies that patent owners can recover damages caused by
infringement in U.S. territories––including orbiting modules or
extraterrestrial facilities––in cases where damages arise out of the
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subsequent use, production, or sale of the invention in the territory of other
countries.
2.

The Patents in Space Act

This section examines a statute that has attempted to provide answers
to issues of space commercial activities involving patents: The Patents in
Space Act of 1990.224
The U.N. Treaties do not expressly address the applicability of
national intellectual property laws to activities taking place entirely in space,
as opposed to activities that partially take place on Earth.225 Nevertheless,
such application seems to derive from the joint application of the Outer
Space Treaty and the Registration Convention, converging on the
proposition that each state retains jurisdiction and control over the objects it
launches into space and their personnel.226 Jurisdiction and control include,
for most interpreters, the extension of patent laws and thus the ability to
grant patents for inventions developed onboard registered space objects.227
The Patents in Space Act of 1990 sought to codify the principle through the
injection of two short paragraphs in Section 105 of Title 35 of the U.S.C.228
The section provides that inventions made, used, or sold in outer space on a
space object or component under the jurisdiction of the United States are
considered made, used, and sold within the United States for purposes of
patent law. 229
Accordingly, U.S. domestic patent laws can reach an invention
conceived or reduced to practice on a U.S. registered spacecraft no matter
how far from Earth. 230 By the same token, a U.S. patentee can bring an
action for infringement of its patents based on the making, use, or sale of an
invention on a U.S.-registered spacecraft.231 Echoes of the statute reached
the International Space Station Intergovernmental Agreement, which
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reproduced the principle by mandating that patent jurisdiction over ISS
activities rests solely with the country of registration of the specific module
hosting the activity. 232 The Act took upon itself to rectify a trend of
jurisprudential rejection of the “floating island” theory, borrowed from
maritime law: courts had begun to refuse the extension of patent law based
on the mere registration of the vessel, with foreseeable consequences for the
future of patent law in space.233 The statute codified the extra-territorial
reach of U.S. patent law by broadening the definition of infringing act. It is
open to discussion whether this represents a way to heed the mandate of the
U.N. Treaties or to supplant what could be argued to be their omission. 234
The Act’s extension of jurisdiction is not unqualified. Three
exceptions exist in the statute that displace the categorization of acts on U.S.
space objects as infringing. 235 The first two exceptions are relevant to the
present analysis. Extra-terrestrial patent jurisdiction does not apply where,
first, the spacecraft or component at issue is the object of a separate
international agreement to which the U.S. is a party; and second, where the
spacecraft, regardless of being subject to U.S. jurisdiction, is registered with
a foreign country for purposes of the Registration Convention.236 The first
exception encourages a cooperative space environment by displacing the
extension of patent jurisdiction every time there is a sui generis agreement
covering the spacecraft at issue. The necessity of fostering such an
environment, at least at the international level, is dictated by order; if
multiple countries adopted doctrines of extraterritoriality, the aggregate
effect would be problematic.237 As one of the examples infra illustrates, the
second exception’s key difference between jurisdiction and registration
creates compelling interrogatives, being theoretically able to restrict the
power of the United States to enforce patents based on a decision of the
relevant private operator, thereby threatening to create a loophole. 238 Indeed,
registering one’s spacecraft under the law of a country different than the
United States and practicing a patent onboard that spacecraft would not
result in an infringing act, so long as the country is not otherwise bound to
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the United States by international agreements regarding patent recognition or
enforcement.239
The exceptions in § 105(a) exclude application of U.S. patent law to
cases of infringement occurring on spacecraft or extraterrestrial modules
registered under the laws of another country. 240 Among these exceptions, the
one centered upon registration of the spacecraft is the most relevant. Section
105(a) apparently superseded the principles and standards enshrined in
Decca and later expanded by NPT. These standards now only applies to
cases where a spacecraft or component is not registered with another country
nor is it part of a sui generis agreement. 241 The necessary consequence of
this choice, with respect to infringing acts in outer space, is that
considerations of control, beneficial use, or overall service are now
preempted by a formal registration of the spacecraft, creating the potential
for a future problem of flags of convenience. Indeed, under § 105,
technologies operating in outer space with enough connection to the United
States would not fall within U.S. patent law so long as the concerned
spacecraft is formally registered with another country. 242
The Patents in Space Act provides an example of domestic law in
harmony with the principles of international space law. However, the Act
also exemplifies that adherence to the notions of a body of law whose policy
and wording require modernization can be problematic. Merely
incorporating the principle that jurisdiction is based on registration into
domestic laws, as per the Registration Convention, does not eliminate the
challenges affecting the treaties in the first place and it might in fact
propagate them.
III.

THE FUTURE: NEW QUESTIONS

The future of intellectual property in space is an open question. An
unaltered legal framework transitioning to the future on the back of the past
instruments would struggle to support the development of intellectual
property produced by booming space commercial activities. 243 As pointed
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out, the issue lies in the different nature of intellectual property and space
law. 244 The underlying policies of these laws conflict as well, making
convergence harder;245 the application of strictly territorial intellectual
property laws to space, which is supposedly the “province of all mankind,”
might be problematic.
Territoriality does not fit space activities. Territoriality is a terrestrial
construct because it can be reasonably assessed by reference to state borders
or other boundaries. And even then, it’s not always unequivocally. Indeed,
where natural bounds, such as the Karman line, may be subject to
inconsistent definitions and measurements, areas such as the Aouzou Strip
provide an example of contrasting artificial borders resulting in armed
conflict. 246 The commercial dimension of outer space, including the
assertion of intellectual property rights, cannot rely on territorial definitions
that only work when supported by the consensus of the concerned parties.
Territoriality is also incompatible with the non-appropriation principle of the
Outer Space Treaty, prohibiting sovereign claims or occupation: absent clear
boundaries over certain portions of space, recourse to legal fictions and
extraterritorial laws will become more widespread, fueling inconsistencies
and frictions. 247 The absence of a defined authority in space creates a
vacuum of power and an incentive for unaccountable or unsupervised
activities. It is reasonable to expect that the private space industry and state
parties will gradually test the limits of the Liability Convention. 248 These
critiques exemplify the inability of the old answers to fit to the new
questions posed by space law. Failure to address these questions might
create uncertainty, and uncertainty might hurt investments, thereby slowing
the technological progress upon which space exploration inevitably
depends. 249
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Orbital Patents: Keeping Patent Law with Its Feet on the Ground.

The practice of patenting orbits within system or process patents is an
example of situation whose regulation depends on both IP and space law.
Navigational technologies applying orbital mechanics contribute to
terrestrial economy and, indeed, ownership over particular orbits has been
claimed by a number of countries in the past.250 Patents involving orbits are
numerous, growing in parallel with the satellite industry. 251 The idea of
patenting an orbital route is far older than it would appear, owing its
conceptualization to British writer and inventor Arthur C. Clarke.252
Patenting an orbit, especially a geostationary one, 253 poses the fundamental
issue of precluding access to that particular portion of space with respect to
any other entity unauthorized by the patent owner. Indeed, intellectual
property rights, although formally exclusive, do not in principle entail the
subtraction of anything from another person, unlike exclusive rights in a
parcel of land.254 Despite patents’ exclusionary powers being temporary, a
conflict with the non-appropriation principle is unquestionable. Indeed, the
Outer Space Treaty does not define a time limit after which appropriating
portions of space becomes unlawful; the prohibition is categorical and omnicomprehensive. 255 Whether the mandate of the Outer Space Treaty will
ultimately be respected is a question beyond the scope of this analysis
because it does not affect the issues as they now exist in light of the
applicable law.
The concept of orbital patents reverberates the debate over private
ownership in space. Some argue that private entities are not bound by the
Outer Space Treaty’s non-appropriation clause because incapable of
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asserting sovereign claims and, generally, because they are not the intended
recipient of the Treaty’s obligations.256 Therefore, the argument goes, there
would be no issue in the private ownership of a particular tract of space that
is claimed as part of an orbital route, whether by patent or otherwise. On the
opposite side, some claim that the issue of physically appropriating orbits
routes does not stand because property titles in space would need to derive
from a sovereign exercising its powers over the “territory,” therefore private
entities would be ipso facto crippled in their pursuit of “parcels of space.”257
Notwithstanding the debate on ownership, the Outer Space Treaty proclaims
the free use of space for all mankind, thus including private entities.258
Therefore, the issue is whether patenting an orbit falls within use of space or
whether it spills over into ownership, excluded by the 50-year old treaty. The
exclusionary nature of patented orbits seems to tip the scales in favor of the
latter interpretation: the AMC-14 satellite case of 2008 provides an
emblematic example. 259 A company owning a satellite abandoned its
attempts to salvage the communications system due to the presence of a
patent held by Boeing covering the route chosen for the satellite’s deorbit
and return.260 Boeing refused to concede the right to practice the patent in
order to obtain leverage in a related lawsuit, thereby sinking the satellite and
de facto preventing unauthorized access to the specific route.
Another instance, this one of speculative nature, can be offered to
better exemplify the issue of obtaining exclusionary rights on an orbital
route. Space companies are exploring, and at various stages deploying, socalled satellite constellations. 261 Constellations work as a net, wrapping
Earth in an invisible web to a provide full coverage for communications
services or remote sensing.262 If we assume satellite constellations’ orbits are
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patentable technology and multiply the orbital slots by the number of
satellites––projected to be in the tens of thousands––that a single
constellation may comprise, 263 the portion of space that is claimed assumes
relevant proportions. This clearly points to the finite number of available
portions of space around Earth. Given that an exclusionary right’s value is
inversely proportional to the number of alternatives available to competitors,
would, then, the patent claim be more than mere instructions for a
navigational system? Would it not in fact render use of that portion of space
subject to obtainment of licenses or other compensation and, in other words,
appropriate it? The interrogative is further contextualized by the “spectrum
warehousing” practice adopted by a number of companies. These entities
apply for slots of low Earth orbit not to deploy new satellites, but to
warehouse slots for the purpose of increasing the price of their own services
and decreasing the slots available to competitors.264 Whether by patent or
otherwise, space is being appropriated without regard to the Outer Space
Treaty. The question becomes whether to allow the law to follow the practice
or endeavor to revamp a legal infrastructure that no longer serves its
purpose. 265
By assuming for the sake of argument that a patent can exist in an
orbital route, claiming a portion of space for use within navigational systems
but in fact reserving use of the territory, another interrogative arises: should
the misuse of intellectual property, or other equitable doctrines, step in and
avoid this outcome? The doctrine of patent misuse originated in late 1800s
as a defense against claims of patent infringement, although it was officially
embraced by U.S. the Supreme Court in 1917. 266 On that occasion, the Court
rescinded the permissive scrutiny earlier afforded to patentees in structuring
their business deals, and condemned the practice of tying the concession of
patent licenses to the purchase of non-patented products. 267 The Court
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stressed that whatever prohibition or term the patentee decided to employ
would be valid as long as not grounded in patent law. Since patent law gives
the exclusive right to an inventive contribution, its reward must be
commensurate to the object of that contribution.268 The outlined doctrine, as
applied to the issue of orbital appropriation, poses the question: would it be
possible to invoke misuse to avoid the inequitable result of allowing patents
to impede access to portions of space?
The sharp difference in contexts makes it difficult to reconcile the
case law from the early twentieth century and the practice of patenting
orbital routes; however, the effort is not futile. Against the application of
patent misuse, the owner of a patent claiming an orbit could argue to have
rights in nothing more than the orbit path as an element of the patented
process or system. Conversely, depending on how far the equitable nature of
the defense stretches, 269 one could argue that an element of the physical
world cannot strictly be claimed as part of a patent and therefore lies beyond
the scope of the granted monopoly. The application of patent misuse to orbit
will most likely depend on the specific benefit sought by the patent owner,
and whether this benefit (e.g., prohibition of passage for the specific route)
will be found to stem from patent law or fall outside of its scope.
Assuming that certainty of the law and competition are the seeds of a
thriving commercial environment, the importance of misuse exceeds equity
and touches upon antitrust, as well.270 The AMC-14 Satellite case showed
that orbital patents may be leveraged to restrain a competitor’s activities and
that their powers may extend beyond the realm of the patent law. Therefore,
antitrust might be another device to avoid or rectify the consequences of de
facto orbital appropriation by means of patents.
In conclusion, the Outer Space Treaty’s lexical ambiguities and
broadly stated principles seem to impact its ability to remain the master
document for human expansion into space. 271 Indeed, with respect to the
assertion of ownership claims in space, national domestic laws do not seem
concerned about the old Treaty’s non-appropriation clause. As exemplified
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by orbital patents, it is imperative for international space law to consider a
new array of problems and take a clear stand on the regulation of
forthcoming commercial space activities, whether by abolishing the
principle of non-appropriation or by appropriately defining its contours.
B.

Flags of Convenience: The Patent Infringer’s Guide to the Galaxy.

The evolution from a public aerospace industry model to a private one
has caused yet another relevant change: relations in or across space
increasingly involve private entities, rather than just governments. Private
entities will one day interact with each other in a global environment where
the extent of national laws might be either limited or overreaching. Their
interactions may well include instances of patent infringement related to
inventions developed in space. How will extra-terrestrial enforcement of
patents interface with the current spacecraft registration regime? Scholars
have put forward for discussion the argument that territorial IP applied to
international space law, and specifically to the U.N. Treaties, will cause an
issue comparable to the so-called “flags of convenience.”
The phenomenon, familiar to maritime law and admiralty
connoisseurs, consists in the registration of a vessel under the laws of a
country that has no relationship whatsoever with the vessel, its ownership, or
its activities but that, on the other hand, provides favorable tax regimes or
otherwise comparable benefits.272 A vessel so registered is therefore
officially subject to the convenience state’s laws and jurisdiction. Given that
the Registration Convention ties jurisdiction over spacecraft to a formal
registration with a state’s registry, it seems plausible to expect at some point
in the future the migration of flags of convenience from maritime to space
law. 273 The issue is far into the realm of imagination when applied to fullfledged spacecrafts used in transportation, supply, or exploration. However,
the perspective changes when applying the same principle to satellites or
similar objects. It is indeed not difficult to imagine abuse of technical
innovations intended to store, acquire, or otherwise process information
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through satellites registered in a country with favorable regulations. The
issue is far more interesting in light of the cloud computing and distributed
ledger274 technologies, which aim to disassemble and decentralize traditional
computing, storing, and processing systems.
Infringement and the ability to enforce IP rights depend on a nation’s
jurisdiction over the concerned spacecraft or space module. Jurisdiction
depends, in turn, on the nation having listed the object on its registry, a
requirement that each “launching state” must satisfy for purposes of the
Registration Convention.275 A country qualifies as a launching state when:
(1) it launches the object; (2) it procures the launch; (3) the object is
launched from its territory; or (4) the object is launched from one of its
facilities.276 However, as discussed supra, the U.S. enacted the Patents in
Space Act to extend the scope of its patent laws to inventions occurring in
outer space. Commentators have speculated that, in doing so, the U.S.
created a loophole that would prevent infringement actions in the U.S. where
a company operates from a spacecraft or module that is registered in a
different country. 277 Indeed, under the language of 35 U.S.C. § 105(a), the
presence of infringing technology on a spacecraft providing a service that is
used, controlled, or procured from the U.S. would not be actionable
infringement if the spacecraft is formally registered elsewhere. 278 Similar to
maritime law, the presence of this loophole would encourage, in the future,
the adoption of favorable regulations by countries that are not bound to
recognize U.S. IP rights. 279 These countries would be able to exploit the
economic thrust of private space commercialization by offering the
possibility to escape infringement claims at the expense of companies that
operate through spacecraft or modules registered in the United States.
Similarly, U.S. companies could outsource space launch services to overseas
partners operating in such countries to avoid regulations or other
obligations.280
The question is therefore whether U.S. courts would be able to extend
their jurisdiction over patent infringement occurring on spacecraft formally
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registered in another country but effectively operating, under the case law
standards discussed supra, “within the United States.”281 It has been
concluded that such extension is in principle barred by 35 U.S.C. § 105(a),
because the formal registration with another country’s registry trumps
considerations of control and use within the United States. Nevertheless, the
argument has been made that certain principles of international law might
rectify such a rigid rule and extend one state’s jurisdiction over formally
foreign spacecrafts: for example, territorial jurisdiction, protective
jurisdiction, or the passive personality principle.282 Similarly, it is
noteworthy that the U.S. requires every U.S. person to obtain a license for
space activities, regardless of whether the launching, re-entry, and flight
operations occur within the country, and thus establishing a certain degree of
supervision over these activities. 283
It is clear that the international legal framework as it stands is
inadequate to support the expansion of human activity in space: its vacuums
and uncertainties are being filled by iterative domestic-law efforts that might
one day conflict with one other, adding to the confusion and fueling the
circumvention of obligations. The repercussions of such a rigid regime of
registration not only affect U.S. patent law in its ability to pursue its
underlying policy of progress and advancement, but also affect U.S.
obligations under the Outer Space Treaty, in particular the responsibility that
every state has with respect to its natural and juridical persons.284 Where
some companies might seek to avoid application of U.S. patent law to
preclude the benefit of a patentee, others might employ the tactic to exclude
application of U.S. law in a way that would harm their interests. In both
cases, there is potential for unscrupulous tactics, for which the United States
would in principle be “internationally responsible.”285
It is instructive to remember that, unlike the U.N. Convention on the
High Seas,286 the jurisdiction over spacecraft contemplated in the Outer
Space Treaty may not be exclusive. 287 The several circumstances giving rise
to “launching state” status under the Registration Convention might well be
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shared by different countries, although only one country can have the
spacecraft on its registry for purposes of the Convention.288 Therefore, it is
not difficult to outline the confusion and interpretive issues that arise from
such a legal framework; not only national IP laws might conflict in an
operative sense by creating uncertainty, they might in fact be in violation of
a state’s supervisory obligations under the Treaties. Once again, the ultimate
issue is determining how the international community should look at the
Treaties. The fact that international space law and its national counterparts
are prone to interpretive issues will potentially affect the possibility to keep
track of and properly apportion the responsibilities of launching states and
private space actors. Continuing to allow national laws to fill the gaps left by
the U.N. Treaties is a half measure at best. Although it may provide answers
in the short term, it might also lead to conflicting national laws, thereby
incentivizing unregulated practices such as flags of convenience.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The space race has transferred from the arena of national pride to that
of private enterprise. However, the transition is far from complete, first,
because the role of governments will be, for the foreseeable future, quite
relevant; and second, because the only internationally relevant body of law
purporting to regulate space activities does not directly speak to private
entities. This points to certain fallacies in space law. The challenge for
governments and international authorities rests in deciding whether to let a
50-year old legal framework recede into the background, supplanted by
practice and extraterritorial domestic legislations, or whether to endeavor to
update the instrument that many consider fundamental for the future of
mankind.
The relations between IP, as an extension of private commercial
activity, and international space law appear to be a facet of the challenge. As
explained, the advancement of one seem to inevitably undermine the other.
Nevertheless, solutions are being explored that would ease the relationship
between these two bodies of law without the drawback of renouncing
international obligations or creating an uncertain legal environment for
pioneering space businesses. The ISS Agreement has been a successful
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example thus far, although its markedly practical and quasi-private structure
points to the real issue behind international regulation of outer space. Indeed,
the foundational problem resides with compliance with and enforceability of
international law. Relying on channels of diplomacy and treaty-making
might indeed prove uneventful once private space transportation and
exploration will reach critical mass, multiply, and gradually grow distant
from national governments and their supervision.
The U.N. Treaties do not seem fit to address new questions such as
orbital appropriation or flags of convenience. This inability derives from
their nature of international law instruments as well as the specific language
they adopt. The future of commercial expansion and IP into space cannot
rely on a legal framework that, by virtue of its omissions, outdated policies,
and close-to-immutable nature, is unable to adapt to and overcome new
challenges. The risks of employing such a framework without a critical filter
include slowing down progress, hindering states’ ability to reach or enforce
the settlement of disputes, and incentivizing unscrupulous business
practices.
Although revamping the U.N. Treaties is envisioned by many as the
optimal outcome, the solution hardly addresses all the concerns. As the
stringent obligations of the Treaties show, subjecting commercial expansion
and intellectual property in space to a set of outdated international rules
might in fact work against their development. As the commercial approach
to space evolves, international space law needs to determine whether to lead
or follow. At stake in this determination is the pace at which we will
proceed, outwards or inwards, through the Universe.

